M.A. (ENGLISH)

1ST SEMESTER

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PAPER: II LITERARY THEORY- KEY CONCEPTS

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INDEX

UNIT 1

1) Antonio Gramsci "Hegemony and Separation of Powers"

Q. What is the thought and ideas of Antonio Gramsci in "Hegemony and Separation of Powers"?

Or

Summary of in "Hegemony and Separation of Powers"

Ans. Gramsci developed the notion of hegemony in the *Prison Writings*. The idea came as part of his critique of the deterministic economist interpretation of history; of "mechanical historical materialism." Hegemony, to Gramsci, is the "cultural, moral and ideological" leadership of a group over allied and subaltern groups. This leadership, however, is not only exercised in the superstructure –or in the terms of Benedetto Croce– is not only ethico-political, because it also needs

to be economic, and be based on the function that the leading group exercises in the nucleus of economic activity. It is based on the equilibrium between consent and coercion. Gramsci first noted that in Europe, the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, ruled with the consent of subordinate masses. The bourgeoisie was hegemonic because it protected some interests of the subaltern classes in order to get their support. The task for the proletariat was to overcome the leadership of the bourgeoisie and become hegemonic itself.

- Although for some scholars the Gramscian concept of hegemony supposes the leading role of the dominant class in the economy, Gramsci believed that the leading role of the dominant class must include ideology and consciousness, that is, the superstructure. The location of cultural, ideological, and intellectual variables as fundamental for the proletariat in its struggle to become a leading class is Gramsci's main contribution to Marxist theory. With it, the Italian intellectual sought to undermine the economic determinism of historical materialism. He was acknowledging that human beings had a high degree of agency in history: human will and intellect played a role as fundamental as the economy.

- Even though Gramsci was harshly critical of what he called the "vulgar historical materialism" and economism of Marxism, as a Marxist he assumed the fundamental importance of the economy. At this point, however, economic determinism seems to be a problem for the Gramscian concept of hegemony, and the ways the proletariat can become hegemonic. According to Gramsci, only a hegemonic group that has the consent of allies and subalterns can start a revolution, which would mean that it is necessary to establish proletarian hegemony before the socialist revolution. However, how can the proletariat have a dominant position in the world of economy before the socialist revolution? How could the proletarians dominate the economy if the bourgeoisie is the class that controls the means of production and, therefore, controls the economy? Here Gramsci proposes that, in order to achieve a hegemonic position, the proletariat must ally with other social groups struggling for the future interests of socialist society, like the peasantry. The idea was to establish a

new historical bloc (one that breaks the order established by the capitalist structure and the political and ideological superstructures on which the bourgeoisie relies) and a new collective will of the subaltern classes. This, in words of Im Hyug Baeg, can be interpreted as "counter-hegemony" something that "is not a real hegemony in strict sense, but economic, political and ideological preparations for hegemony before overthrowing capitalism or before winning state power (Hyug Baeg, 142)."

- One of the ways the proletariat must undertake such a task is through "organic intellectuals," which for Gramsci, "are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government." Their "function in society is primarily that of organizing, administering, directing, educating or leading others." These specialized cadres, formed both in the working-class political party and through education, had the duty of organizing, administering, directing, educating or leading others. The formation of a national-popular collective is not an autonomous process, nor is the will of that collective. The organic intellectuals, who must be unrelated to the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, must organize and mediate in the formation of the national-popular collective will.

- What is Antonio Gramsci's view of power?

- In Gramsci's view, a class cannot dominate in modern conditions by merely advancing its own narrow economic interests; neither can it dominate purely through force and coercion. Rather, it must exert intellectual and moral leadership, and make alliances and compromises with a variety of forces.

- What does Gramsci's theory of hegemony say about how the ruling class maintains its power over the workers?

- He introduced the concept of hegemony or ideological and moral leadership of society, to explain how the ruling class maintains its position and argued that the proletariat must develop its own 'counter-hegemony'

(or alternative set of ideas) to win leadership of society from the bourgeoisie.

- What did Gramsci say about hegemony?

- For Gramsci, hegemony was a form of control exercised primarily through a society's superstructure, as opposed to its base or social relations of production of a predominately economic character

- Cultural Hegemony According to Antonio Gramsci

  Gramsci argued that consent to the rule of the dominant group is achieved by the spread of ideologies—beliefs, assumptions, and values—through social institutions such as schools, churches, courts, and the media, among others.05-Jan-2020

- How did Gramsci conceptualize civil society and state?

- He seemingly rejected the clear differentiation drawn in mainstream liberal theory between the state and civil society; instead, he said that civil society and state are one and the same. For Gramsci, 'State' is a sum of political society (coersion) and civil society (consent). State for Gramsci is broader than the state in common use.

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UNIT-1

2) Louis Althusser "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"

Q. Write a critical note on "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses".

Ans

"I must now expose more fully something which was briefly glimpsed in my analysis when I spoke of the necessity to renew the means of production if production is to be possible. That was a passing hint. Now I shall consider it for itself."

-**Louis Althusser 1970**
"Lenin and Philosophy" and Other Essays

Althusser resumed his Marxist-related publications in 1960 as he translated, edited, and published a collection directed by Hyppolite about Ludwig Feuerbach's works. The objective of this endeavour was to identify Feuerbach's influence on Marx's early writings, contrasting it with the absence of his thought on Marx's mature works. This work spurred him to write "On the Young Marx: Theoretical Questions" ("Sur le jeune Marx – Questions de théorie", 1961). Published in the journal *La Pensée*, it was the first in a series of articles about Marx that were later collected in his most famous book *For*

Marx. He inflamed the French debate on Marx and Marxist philosophy, and gained a considerable number of supporters Inspired by this recognition, he started to publish more articles on Marxist thought; in 1964, Althusser published an article titled "Freud and Lacan" in the journal *La Nouvelle Critique*, which greatly influenced the Freudo-Marxism thought. At the same time, he invited Lacan to a lecture on Baruch Spinoza and the fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis.The impact of the articles led Althusser to change his teaching style at the ENS, and he started to minister a series of seminars on the following topics: "On the Young Marx" (1961–1962), "The Origins of Structuralism" (1962–1963; it versed on Foucault's *History of Madness*, which Althusser highly appreciated), "Lacan and Psychoanalysis" (1963–1964), and *Reading Capital* (1964–1965). These seminars aimed for a "return to Marx" and were attended by a new generation of students.

Althusser begins the essay by reiterating the Marxist theory that in order to exist, a social formation is required to essentially, continuously and perpetually reproduce the productive forces (labour power and means of production), the conditions of production and the relations of production. The reproduction of labour power is ensured by the wage system which pays a minimum amount to the workers so that they appear to work day after day, thereby limiting their vertical mobility. The reproduction of the conditions of production and the reproduction of the relations of production happens through the state apparatuses which are insidious machinations controlled by the capitalist ruling ideology in the context of a class struggle to repress, exploit, extort and subjugate the ruled class.

The Marxist spatial metaphor of the edifice describes a social formation constituted by the foundational infrastructure, i.e. the economic base, on which stands the superstructure consisting of two floors: the law/the state (the politico-legal floor) and ideology. A detailed description of both structures is provided below:

The infrastructure consists of the forces, the means, and the relations of production. The following examples reflect the concept of the infrastructure in further detail:

- The forces included the workers. Also, it consists of the technical knowledge to perform the work, such as training and knowledge.
- The means are the materials of production. This includes the raw materials, tools, and machines.
- The relations of production reflect the interactions between workers as well as between the workers and owners

The superstructure arises from the infrastructure and consists of culture and ideology. The following examples reflect the concept of the superstructure in further detail:

- The culture includes the laws, politics, art, etc.

- Ideology includes the world views, values, and beliefs

Marx's theory is that the superstructure comes from the infrastructure and reconditions ways of life and living so that the infrastructure continues to be produced.

Althusser extends this topographical paradigm by stating that the infrastructural economic base is endowed with an "index of effectivity" which enables it to ultimately determine the functioning of the superstructure. He scrutinizes this structural metaphor by discussing the superstructure in detail. A close study of the superstructure is necessitated due to its relative autonomy over the base and its reciprocal action on the base

Repressive state apparatuses

The ruling class uses **repressive state apparatuses** (**RSA**) to dominate the working class. The basic, social function of the RSA (government, courts, police and armed forces, etc.) is timely intervention within politics in favour of the interests of the ruling class, by repressing the subordinate social classes as required, using either violent or nonviolent coercive means. The ruling class controls the RSA because they also control the powers of the state (political, legislative, armed).

Althusser has enhanced the Marxist theory of the state by distinguishing the repressive apparatuses of the state from the ideological apparatuses of the state (ISA), which comprise an array of social institutions and multiple, political realities that propagate many ideologies—the religious ISA, the educational ISA, the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA, the communications ISA, the cultural ISA, etc.

The differences between the RSA and the ISA are:

- The repressive state apparatus (RSA) functions as a unified entity (an institution), unlike the ideological state apparatus (ISA), which is diverse in nature and plural in function. What unites the disparate ISA, however, is their ultimate control by the ruling ideology.

- The apparatuses of the state, repressive and ideological, each perform the double functions of violence and ideology. A state apparatus cannot be exclusively repressive or exclusively ideological. The distinction between an RSA and an ISA is its primary function in society: respectively, the administration of violent repression and the dissemination of ideology. In practice, the RSA is the means of repression and violence, and, secondarily, a means of ideology; whereas, the primary, practical function of the ISA is as the means for the dissemination of ideology, and, secondarily, as a means of political violence and repression. The secondary functions of the ISA are effected in a concealed and a symbolic manner.

Moreover, when individual persons and political groups threaten the social order established by the dominant social class, the state invokes the stabilising functions of the repressive state apparatus. As such, the benign forms of social repression affect the judicial system, where ostensibly public contractual language is invoked in order to govern individual and collective behaviour in society. As internal threats (social, political,

economic) to the dominant order appear, the state applies proportionate social repression: police suppression, incarceration, and military intervention.

Ideological state apparatuses

Ideological state apparatuses (**ISA**), according to Althusser, use methods other than physical violence to achieve the same objectives as RSA. They may include educational institutions (e.g. schools), media outlets, churches, social and sports clubs and the family. These formations are ostensibly apolitical and part of civil society, rather than a *formal* part of the state (i.e. as is the case in an RSA). In terms of psychology they could be described as psychosocial, because they aim to inculcate ways of seeing and evaluating things, events and class relations. Instead of expressing and imposing order, through violent repression, ISA disseminate ideologies that reinforce the control of a dominant class. People tend to be co-opted by fear of social rejection, e.g. ostracisation, ridicule and isolation. In Althusser's view, a social class cannot hold state power unless, and until, it simultaneously exercises hegemony (domination) over and through ISA.

Educational ISA, in particular, assume a dominant role in a capitalist economy, and conceal and mask the ideology of the ruling class behind the "liberating qualities" of education, so that the hidden agendas of the ruling class are inconspicuous to most teachers, students, parents and other interested members of society. Althusser said that the school has supplanted the church as the crucial ISA for indoctrination, which augments the reproduction of the relations of production (i.e. the capitalist relations of exploitation) by training the students to become sources of labour power, who work for and under capitalists.

However, because ISA cannot dominate as obviously or readily as RSA, ideological state apparatuses may themselves become a site of class struggle. That is, subordinate social classes are able to find the means and occasions to express class struggle politically and in so doing counter the dominant class, either by utilizing ideological contradictions inherent in ISA, or by campaigns to take control of positions within the ISA. This, nevertheless, will not in itself prevent the dominant class from retaining its position in control of RSA.

UNIT- II

1) Elaine Showalter

"Twenty Years On: A Literature Of Their Own Revisited"

Q. Write the critical theory of Elaine Showalter in "Twenty Years On: A Literature Of Their Own Revisited"

Or

Feminism in "Twenty Years On: A Literature Of Their Own Revisited"

Elaine Showalter is an influential American critic who coined the term gynocriticism, which is a woman-centric approach to literary analysis. Elaine Showalter's essay "Twenty Years On: A Literature of Their Own Revisited" is a retrospective reflection on her influential book A Literature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Bronte to Lessing, which was published in 1977 in which She proposed a model of three phases of feminism. The three phases are:

- **Feminine** (1840-1880): Women writers imitate men and write in an effort to equal the intellectual achievements of the male culture, and internalize its assumptions about female nature. Examples of writers in this phase are Jane Austen, the Bronte sisters, and George Eliot.

- **Feminist** (1880-1920): Women's writing protests against male standards and values, and advocates women's rights and values, including a demand for autonomy. Examples of writers in this phase are Virginia Woolf, Katherine Mansfield, and Dorothy Richardson.

- **Female** (1920-present): The focus is now on women's texts as opposed to merely uncovering misogyny in men's texts. Women writers explore their own identity, sexuality, and creativity, and challenge the patriarchal norms and structures. Examples of writers in this phase are Doris Lessing, Margaret Atwood, and Toni Morrison.

In the essay, Showalter revisits the main arguments and themes of her book, such as the development of a female literary tradition, the representation of women's madness and hysteria, and the challenges and opportunities for feminist criticism. She also discusses the changes and continuities in the field of women's writing and criticism since the publication of her book, such as the emergence of new theoretical approaches, the expansion of the canon, the impact of multiculturalism and postcolonialism, and the rise of popular culture and media. Showalter evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of her book, acknowledging its limitations and biases, but also defending its contributions and insights. She concludes by affirming her commitment to the feminist project of recovering and celebrating women's literary heritage.

UNIT-II

2) Luce Irigaray

"When the Goods Get Together"

Q. Comment on the feminism of "When the Goods Get Together".

Ans. Luce Irigaray (born 3 May 1930) is a Belgian-born French feminist, philosopher, linguist, psycholinguist, psychoanalyst, and cultural theorist who examines the uses and misuses of language in relation to women. Irigaray's first and most well known book, published in 1974, was *Speculum of the Other Woman* (1974), which analyzes the texts of Freud, Hegel, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant through the lens of phallocentrism. Irigaray is the author of works analyzing many thinkers, including *This Sex Which Is Not One* (1977), which discusses Lacan's work as well as political economy; *Elemental Passions* (1982) can be read as a response to Merleau-Ponty's article "The Intertwining—The Chiasm" in *The Visible and the Invisible*, and in *The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger* (1999), Irigaray critiques Heidegger's emphasis on the element of earth as the ground of life and speech and his "oblivion" or forgetting of air.

Irigaray employs three different modes in her investigations into the nature of gender, language, and identity: the analytic, the essayistic, and the lyrical poetic. As of October 2021, she is active in the Women's Movements in both France and Italy.

"Women on the Market" (Chapter Eight of **This Sex Which is Not One***)*

Irigaray draws upon Karl Marx's theory of capital and commodities to claim that women are exchanged between men in the same way as any other commodity is. She argues that our entire society is predicated on this exchange of women. Her exchange value is determined by society, while her use value is her natural qualities. Thus, a woman's self is divided between her use and exchange values, and she is only desired for the exchange value. This system creates three types of women: the mother, who is all use

value; the virgin, who is all exchange value; and the prostitute, who embodies both use and exchange value.

She further uses additional Marxist foundations to argue that women are in demand due to their perceived shortage and as a result, males seek "to have them all," or seek a surplus like the excess of commodity buying power, capital, that capitalists seek constantly. Irigaray speculates thus that perhaps, "the way women are used matters less than their number." In this further analogy of women "on the market," understood through Marxist terms, Irigaray points out that women, like commodities, are moved between men based on their exchange value rather than just their use value, and the desire will always be surplus – making women almost seem like capital, in this case, to be accumulated. "As commodities, women are thus two things at once: utilitarian objects and bearers of value."[

Elemental Passions

Luce Irigaray's *Elemental Passions* (1982) could be read as a response to Merleau-Ponty's article "The Intertwining—The Chiasm" in *The Visible and the Invisible*. Like Merleau-Ponty, Irigaray describes corporeal intertwining or vision and touch. Counteracting the narcissistic strain in Merleau-Ponty's chiasm, she assumes that sexual difference must precede the intertwining. The subject is marked by the alterity or the "more than one" and encoded as a historically contingent gendered conflict

Philosophy

Some of Irigaray's books written in her lyrical mode are imaginary dialogues with significant contributors to Western philosophy, such as Nietzsche and Heidegger. However, Irigaray also writes a significant body of work
on Hegel, Descartes, Plato, Aristotle and Levinas, Spinoza, as well as Merleau-Ponty. Her academic work is largely influenced by a wide range of philosophers and cannot be limited to one approach.

Language

She continued to conduct empirical studies about language in a variety of settings, researching the differences between the way men and women speak. This focus on sexual difference is the key characteristic of Irigaray's oeuvre, since she is seeking to provide a site from which a feminine language can eventuate. Through her research, Irigaray discovered a correlation between the suppression of female thought in the Western world and language of men and women. She concluded that there are gendered language patterns that denote dominance in men and subjectivity in women.

Gender identity

Since 1990, Irigaray's work has turned increasingly toward women and men together. In *Between East and West, From Singularity to Community* (1999) and in *The Way of Love* (2002), she imagines new forms of love for a global democratic community. In *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*, she introduces the idea of relationships between men and women centered around a bond other than reproduction. She acknowledges themes

including finiteness and intersubjectivity, embodied divinity, and the emotional distinction between the two sexes. She concludes that Western culture is unethical due to gender discrimination.

Some feminists criticize Irigaray's perceived essentialist positions. However, there is much debate among scholars as to whether or not Irigaray's theory of sexual difference is, indeed, an essentialist one. The perception that her work is essentialist concentrates on her attention to sexual difference, taking this to constitute a rehearsal of heteronormative sexuality. As Helen Fielding states, the uneasiness among feminists about Irigaray's discussion of masculinity and femininity does not so much reveal Irigaray's heteronormative bias as much as it "arises out of an inherited cultural understanding [on the part of her critics] that posits nature as either unchanging organism or as matter that can be ordered, manipulated and inscribed upon. Hence the concern over essentialism is itself grounded in the binary thinking that preserves a hierarchy of...culture over nature."

W. A. Borody has criticised Irigaray's phallogocentric argument as misrepresenting the history of philosophies of "indeterminateness" in the West. Irigaray's "black and white" claims that the masculine equates to determinateness and that the feminine equates to indeterminateness which contain a degree of cultural and historical validity, but not when they are deployed to self-replicate a similar form of the gender-othering they originally sought to overcome.

In *Fashionable Nonsense*, Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont criticized Irigaray's use of hard-science terminology in her writings. Among the criticisms, they question the purported interest Einstein had in "accelerations without electromagnetic reequilibrations"; confusing special relativity and general relativity; and her claim that $E = mc^2$ is a "sexed equation" because "it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us". In reviewing Sokal and Bricmont's book, Richard Dawkins wrote that Irigaray's assertion that fluid mechanics was unfairly neglected in physics due to its association with "feminine" fluids (in contrast to "masculine" solids) was "daffy absurdity"

UNIT-III

1) JACQUES DERRIDA

"STRUCTURE, SIGN AND PLAY IN THE DISCOURSE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCE"

Ques What is the philosophy of Derrida in "Structure, Sign and Play In The Discourse of The Human Science"?

Or

Theme of post structuralism in "Structure, Sign and Play In The Discourse of The Human Science".

Ans. Jacques Deridda A French philosopher, critically engages with structuralism. He comments on what the structure is and engages with the politics of the structure itself, what he terms as the "structurality of structure". This essay showcases the extent of limits of structuralism, which provides the structures but fails to examine the concept of structure itself.

Derrida explains that the concept of structure is as old as the concept of episteme, but has never been discussed. On explaining the structure he first defines what a center is- "an organizing principle that allows for limited play", i.e. center gives structure its structurality, "orients, balances and organizes the structure", but at the same time, inhibits play and allows a limited discourse to take play within the structure itself, for with the center

comes boundaries. Another characteristic of center is that it is the part of the yet at the same time it is unaffected by the changes taking place in it. Therefore the center that leads coherence and structurality to a structure, it at the same time escapes it. Therefore, the paradoxical concept of center being both inside and outside the structure, i.e. the center that governs the center escapes its totality at the same time. For example: God is the center of human life and dictates laws, yet at the same time he is not the part of this life. He is absent from the play of human life. Derrida then chooses to call the center as "a transcendental signifier." Lastly, he presents the very essence of the center that by limiting play, it is mastering anxiety that free play leads to.

Examining the history of structures Derrida elaborates that one center gets replaced by another. Thus the factors governing the play too get epistemologically shifted. For example, the center of human society shifted from God to Renaissance man. Thus, at given point the center of the structure cannot be substituted by various permutations but historically the center can get replaced.

Defining the event that leads to disruption of the structure- the concept of "rupture" is discussed. This comes about at a point when structurality of structure is examined. And with this examiniation the structure gets destroyed.

Thereby comes a state when there is no center, conclusively no locus. At this moment, with removal of center, infinite play takes place. Each sign defines itself with respect to other signs, showing that there is no center, and in this case even "transcendental signifier" needs to be defined with respect to other signs. So there is no structure and all is then a discourse.

An important question answered by the deconstructionist is that "where and how does this decentering , this thinking of structurality of structure, occur?" To this the answer comes as follows: there is no particular event or doctrine that caused it. But discuses "three names" in particular:

- Neitzchean critique of metaphysics and especially that of Being and Truth.

- Freudian critique of self-presence.

- Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics, of ontology, of the determination of Being as presence.

As and when these theories rupture the pre-existing center they also enter into a unique circle that relates the "history of metaphysics and the history of destruction of metaphysics." A pertinent point here to be noted is that nowhere is Derrida favoring the doing away of structures. In fact, what he is suggesting is that necessity to keep a structure for discourse to take place. The focus is on an alternate play, of not conforming to the entire concept of sign itself.

He explains this with relation to the Saussure's concept of sign (linguistics), where a sign is composed of signifier and signified. Signifier is the physical form of sign and signified is the verbal/word used to define the signifier. On the onset the idea of not doing away with the sign is maintained. He talks about the reduction of the binary between the signifier and the signified. The two ways of doing this is:

1. First is the traditional way of submitting to the traditional way of submitting to the arbitrary relation between signified and signifier.

2. Second is to completely be done away with this arbitrary relation between the signifier and signified

There is where the crux of the essay lies. Derrida wishes to focus on a new mode of thinking, not limiting within the old one. This is where Freud, Heidegger and Nietzsche fall short. For at the very moment they focus on destroying the structure, they the entering into the discourse of the structure itself. He substantiates this concept by using the example of ethnography, where he says that the science of ethnography disrupts the idea of Europe as the center but the moment he renounces it, he is entering into a discourse within the premise of ethnocentricity.

Derrida goes on to deconstruct Levi-Strauss's idea of binaries. Strauss devises two categories: nature and culture. Where anything that is spontaneous is Nature and anything that is acquired is Culture. This opposition is dissolved through by something called the "scandal". To explain this, the idea of incest prohibition is used. Incest prohibition is a universal, and every culture has it that it seems a natural act, but at the same time each culture governs this in their own way, thereby making the idea specific.(For example: the legalization of marriage between cousins amongst the Muslims is acceptable but not amongst the Hindus) In a contradiction like this where can the "scandal" be placed? In both? So here, the idea of binaries is refuted.

The main point of focus here is that Derrida, in the first place, is not withering away the structures but finding flaws in it. The structure has to be kept to be in order to critique it. What structuralism does is to attribute a truth value to a structure; this is what is shaken, by the theory of deconstruction. Then you can discard the structure or use it to find its play.

He calls this method as "bricolage" and the person doing that is a "bricoleur." Borrowing the terminology from the Strauss's *The Savage Mind* "bricoleur" is a person who uses the mean at his disposal in any desired permutations and combitions as he wishes to reach the end goal.Strauss places the binary opposition of a bricoleur to that of an engineer. An engineer is someone who builds structures that are coherent, stable, have a fixed center and an absolute truth value. The play of deconstruction of binaries by Derrida here is observable.

He explains since every discourse that borrows its ideas from the cites, coherent or not, is a bricoleur and an engineer too creates structure and discourse, limited or not, from within itself. The opposition gets diluted and engineer then is a myth created by bricoleur.

Finally Derrida observes, that there are two way to interpret structure, sign and play: one aims to decipher an absolute truth and avoid play and the other affirms play. The first way was dominant throughout human history and the second is only emerging now. Play must supersede the alternatives of presence and absence and hence there is no need to be concerned with the absence of the center or of origin. Play is possible if we can forego our need for truth. It is possible then, to have a philosophy without concepts, without orientation and without coherence.

UNIT-III

2) MICHEL FOUCAULT

"TRUTH AND POWER"

Ques. According to Foucault what is the concept of power in **"Truth and Power"?**

Ans. Michel Foucault, the French postmodernist, has been hugely influential in shaping understandings of power, leading away from the analysis of actors who use power as an instrument of coercion, and even away from the discreet structures in which those actors operate, toward the idea that 'power is everywhere', diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and 'regimes of truth' (Foucault 1991; Rabinow 1991). Power for Foucault is what makes us what we are, operating on a quite different level from other theories:

'His work marks a radical departure from previous modes of conceiving power and cannot be easily integrated with previous ideas, as power is diffuse rather than concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them' (Gaventa 2003: 1)

Foucault challenges the idea that power is wielded by people or groups by way of 'episodic' or 'sovereign' acts of domination or coercion, seeing it instead as dispersed and pervasive. 'Power is everywhere' and 'comes from everywhere' so in this sense is neither an agency nor a structure (Foucault 1998: 63). Instead it is a kind of 'metapower' or 'regime of truth' that pervades society, and which is in constant flux and negotiation. Foucault uses the term 'power/knowledge' to signify that power is constituted through accepted forms of knowledge, scientific understanding and 'truth':

'Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true' (Foucault, in Rabinow 1991).

These 'general politics' and 'regimes of truth' are the result of scientific discourse and institutions, and are reinforced (and redefined) constantly through the education system, the media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies. In this sense, the 'battle for truth' is not for some absolute truth that can be discovered and accepted, but is a battle about 'the rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power are attached to the true'… a battle about 'the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays'(Foucault, in Rabinow 1991). This is the inspiration for Hayward's focus on power as boundaries that enable and constrain possibilities for action, and on people's relative capacities to know and shape these boundaries (Hayward 1998).

Foucault is one of the few writers on power who recognise that power is not just a negative, coercive or repressive thing that forces us to do things against our wishes, but can also be a necessary, productive and positive force in society (Gaventa 2003: 2):

'We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production' (Foucault 1991: 194).

Power is also a major source of social discipline and conformity. In shifting attention away from the 'sovereign' and 'episodic' exercise of power, traditionally centred in feudal states to coerce their subjects, Foucault pointed to a new kind of 'disciplinary power' that could be observed in the administrative systems and social services that were created in 18th century Europe, such as prisons, schools and mental hospitals. Their systems of

surveillance and assessment no longer required force or violence, as people learned to discipline themselves and behave in expected ways.

Foucault was fascinated by the mechanisms of prison surveillance, school discipline, systems for the administration and control of populations, and the promotion of norms about bodily conduct, including sex. He studied psychology, medicine and criminology and their roles as bodies of knowledge that define norms of behaviour and deviance. Physical bodies are subjugated and made to behave in certain ways, as a microcosm of social control of the wider population, through what he called 'bio-power'. Disciplinary and bio-power create a 'discursive practice' or a body of knowledge and behaviour that defines what is normal, acceptable, deviant, etc. – but it is a discursive practice that is nonetheless in constant flux (Foucault 1991).

A key point about Foucault's approach to power is that it transcends politics and sees power as an everyday, socialised and embodied phenomenon. This is why state-centric power struggles, including revolutions, do not always lead to change in the social order. For some, Foucault's concept of power is so elusive and removed from agency or structure that there seems to be little scope for practical action. But he has been hugely influential in pointing to the ways that norms can be so embedded as to be beyond our perception – causing us to discipline ourselves without any wilful coercion from others.

Contrary to many interpretations, Foucault believed in possibilities for action and resistance. He was an active social and political commentator who saw a role for the 'organic intellectual'. His ideas about action were, like Hayward's, concerned with our capacities to recognise and question socialised norms and constraints. To challenge power is not a matter of seeking some 'absolute truth' (which is in any case a socially produced power), but 'of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time' (Foucault, in Rabinow 1991: 75). Discourse can be a site of both power and resistance, with scope to 'evade, subvert or contest strategies of power' (Gaventa 2003: 3):

'Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it... We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby a discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing

strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart' (Foucault 1998: 100-1).

The powercube is not easily compatible with Foucauldian understandings of power, but there is scope for critical analysis and strategic action at the level of challenging or shaping discourse – for example taking the psychological/cultural meaning of 'invisible power' and 'hegemony' as a lens with which to look at the whole. Foucault's approach has been widely used to critique development thinking and paradigms, and the ways in which development discourses are imbued with power (Gaventa 2003, citing the work of Escobar, Castells and other 'post-development' critics).

At a the level of practice, activists and practitioners use methods of discourse analysis to identify normative aid language that needs more careful scrutiny, and to shape alternative framings. An example of a very practical tool for doing this is included in the IIED Power Tools collection, called the 'Writing Tool', and in NGO workshops we have used a simple method of discourse analysis to examine mission statements and programme aims.

The French philosopher Michel Foucault claimed that "truth isn't outside power," the "reward of free spirits," nor, as Immanuel Kant imagined two centuries earlier, "the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves." Rather, truth is *produced* by power—a generalized condition outside of which no one stands—and shaped by different "knowledge regimes" in which societies accept certain things to be true. Instead of a world in which the courageous "speak truth to power," Foucault proposes the unsettling suggestion that there is no truth without power. How, according to Foucault, is a discourse created, and in what ways does it regulate truth, meaning, and the very boundaries of the thinkable?

Unit-IV

1)MAHATMA GANDHI

"PASSIVE RESISTANCE AND EDUCATION" (HIND SWARAJ)

Ques. What is the thought and ideas discussed by Gandhi in "Passive Resistance and Education, (Hind Swaraj)?

Ans. *Hind Swaraj* is Gandhi's political, philosophical, and economic manifesto for the Indian Independence Movement. When he first wrote this book in 1909, Gandhi had been living in South Africa for more than 15 years and was virtually unknown in his native India. However, this would all change over the next decade, as his ideas became the driving philosophy behind the massive popular campaign to free India from British rule. In *Hind Swaraj*, Gandhi lays out these ideas through a dialogue between two characters: **the editor**, who represents Gandhi, and **the reader**, who represents Gandhi's audience—mainly politically active, educated Indian professionals. Gandhi's key message is that achieving independence, or **Swaraj** (home-rule), is not as simple as taking up arms and forcing the British out of India. Rather, he argues that Indians must win their independence through a method he calls *satyagraha*—which literally means "the force that comes from holding onto truth," but is usually translated as "**passive resistance**" or "nonviolent civil disobedience." Gandhi believes that *satyagraha* is the best way to overthrow the British colonial government because it draws its strength from morality, not weapons, and builds a democratic community through the very process of protest.

Gandhi first argues that armed rebellion, as proposed by extremists in

the **Indian National Congress**, is not a viable strategy for Indians to win

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independence. Like many of these extremists, **the reader** argues that the British conquered India with military force, so Indians are justified in using the same to kick the British out. But Gandhi disagrees. First of all, Indians aren't armed and simply don't have the resources to fight a war. Notwithstanding these limits, Gandhi thinks that revenge is never an adequate reason to fight a war because it creates an endless cycle of escalation. If the Indians retaliate to British aggression by taking up arms, the British would retaliate disproportionately and become even more repressive. This means that taking up arms would likely only worsen Indians' situation.

Similarly, when the reader proposes that a group of mercenaries should try to assassinate British officials and launch a coup, Gandhi points out that these mercenaries will then take over India's government—at which point they are likely to be just as repressive and self-interested as the British. So Gandhi concludes that in India, armed revolution or guerrilla war would lead to "English rule without the Englishman." In practical terms, he means that a revolution would just replace the repressive English government with a repressive Indian one. At its core, Gandhi's argument against brute force is moral, not just practical: he thinks there is always an inherent connection between the means of action and the ends that those means produce. He compares this to the connection between a seed and the tree that grows from it. That means that using violence only breeds more violence. Therefore, to create a free and just society, Indians must fight with freedom and justice.

To meet this challenge, Gandhi proposes *satyagraha*—passive resistance, or nonviolent civil disobedience. He argues that passive resistance is the only free and just tool for protest, which means it's the only legitimate strategy Indians can use to fight for independence from the repressive English government. Gandhi defines *satyagraha* as making the decision to follow moral laws rather than human ones. This means disobeying unjust laws

imposed by the government. *Satyagraha* requires activists to accept the consequences the government imposes on them—even if they have to suffer or die for their beliefs. In the context of 20th-century colonial India, this means that Indians should live by the rules of their own religions and communities, while refusing to follow English laws. Although passive resistance is a simple concept, creating a *satyagraha* movement is not easy, because it requires deep moral courage. Violent resistance only requires bodily strength, Gandhi argues, but passive resistance requires the bodily strength to withstand physical violence, as well as an even greater mental and spiritual strength.

Passive resistance works, according to Gandhi, because it shows that the people consider the government illegitimate. Practically speaking, laws only constrain people if everybody follows them—either because they agree with them, or because they fear the consequences of breaking the law. But when people accept the consequences of unjust laws, these laws lose their power. This forces unjust governments into a moral dilemma: they either attack nonviolent protestors and further lose their legitimacy, or they acquiesce to the people's demands. As a result, the *satyagraha* movement either proves the government's illegitimacy—and wins even more support—or achieves its demands.

Ultimately, for Gandhi, *satyagraha* is not only an effective political strategy: it is also the deepest expression of human morality. Gandhi argues that the power behind *satyagraha* is the force of truth, love, and the soul—the same force that holds together the universe and the human race. When people protest nonviolently, they are declaring their commitment to building a better society—one that truly upholds their moral duties to one another. In fact, through passive resistance, they are actually *fulfilling* their moral duties to the community, because they choose to follow moral laws rather than the government's laws. This means that passive resistance isn't just a call for a

more humane society: it's also the means through which people build it. In other words, the organized community of nonviolent protestors *is* the new, humane, democratic society that will eventually replace the oppressive government.

Today, Gandhi's concept of nonviolent civil disobedience is virtually synonymous with popular protest. But it can be easy to forget that this idea only gained widespread acceptance in the 20th century, in large part through the successful Indian Independence Movement. Ever since, Gandhi's ideas have left an unmistakable mark on people's struggles for democracy around the world, ranging from the American Civil Rights Movement and the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement to the Arab Spring.

UNIT-IV

2) EDWARD SAID

"THE SCOPE OF ORIENTALISM"

Ques. What is the significance of Orientalism?

Ans. *Orientalism* is a 1978 book by Edward W. Said, in which the author establishes the term "Orientalism" as a critical concept to describe the West's commonly contemptuous depiction and portrayal of The East, i.e. the Orient. Societies and peoples of the Orient are those who inhabit the places of Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. Said argues that Orientalism, in the sense of the Western scholarship about the Eastern World, is inextricably tied to the imperialist societies who produced it, which makes much Orientalist work inherently political and servile to power.

According to Said, in the Middle East, the social, economic, and cultural practices of the ruling Arab elites indicate they are imperial satraps who have internalized a romanticized version of Arab Culture created by French, British and later, American, Orientalists. Examples used in the book include critical analyses of the colonial literature of Joseph Conrad, which conflates a people, a time, and a place into one narrative of an incident and adventure in an exotic land.

Through the critical application of post-structuralism in its scholarship, *Orientalism* influenced the development of literary theory, cultural criticism, and the field of Middle Eastern studies, especially with regard to how academics practice their intellectual inquiries when examining, describing, and explaining the Middle East. Moreover, the scope of Said's scholarship established *Orientalism* as a foundational text in the field

of postcolonial studies, by denoting and examining the connotations of Orientalism, and the history of a given country's post-colonial period.

As a public intellectual, Edward Said debated historians and scholars of area studies, notably, historian Bernard Lewis, who described the thesis of *Orientalism* as "anti-Western". For subsequent editions of *Orientalism*, Said wrote an Afterword (1995) and a Preface (2003) addressing discussions of the book as cultural criticism.

The term *orientalism* denotes the exaggeration of difference, the presumption of Western superiority, and the application of clichéd analytical models for perceiving the "Oriental world". This intellectual tradition is the background for Said's presentation of Orientalism as a European *viewpoint* reflecting a contrived Manichean duality.

As such, Orientalism is the pivotal source of the inaccurate cultural representations that form the foundations of Western thought and perception of the Eastern world, specifically in relation to the Middle East region.

Said distinguishes between at least three separate but interrelated meanings of the term:

1. an academic tradition or field;
2. a worldview, representation, and "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident';" and
3. as a powerful political instrument of domination.

In other words, Said had in mind the "Occidental" (or Western) views of eastern cultures that mirrored the prejudices and ideologies that the colonial experience of Western individuals was shaded by. Said's work drew attention to the obsession of Western writers with women and their role in the preservation (or destruction) of so-called cultural mores, viewing them as either "pristine" (redeemed) or "contaminated" (fallen).

According to an article published by *The New Criterion*, the principal characteristic of Orientalism is a "subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arab-Islamic peoples and their culture," which derives from Western images of what is Oriental (i.e., cultural representations) that reduce the Orient to the fictional essences of "Oriental peoples" and "the places of the

Orient;" such representations dominate the discourse of Western peoples with and about non-Western peoples.

These cultural representations usually depict the 'Orient' as primitive, irrational, violent, despotic, fanatic, and essentially inferior to the westerner or native informant, and hence, 'enlightenment' can only occur when "traditional" and "reactionary" values are replaced by "contemporary" and "progressive" ideas that are either western or western-influenced.

In practice, the imperial and colonial enterprises of the West are facilitated by collaborating régimes of Europeanized Arab élites who have internalized the fictional, and romanticized representations of Arabic culture. The idea of the "Orient" was conceptualized by French and English Orientalists during the 18th century, and was eventually adopted in the 20th century by American Orientalists. As such, Orientalist stereotypes of the cultures of the Eastern world have served, and continue to serve, as implicit justifications for the colonial ambitions and the imperial endeavors of the U.S. and the European powers. In that vein, about contemporary Orientalist stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims, Said states:

So far as the United States seems to be concerned, it is only a slight overstatement to say that Moslems and Arabs are essentially seen as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab–Moslem life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Arab world. What we have, instead, is a series of crude, essentialized caricatures of the Islamic world, presented in such a way as to make that world vulnerable to military aggression.

Moving from the assertion that 'pure knowledge' is simply not possible (as all forms of knowledge are inevitably influenced by ideological standpoints), Said sought to explain the connection between ideology and literature. He argued that "Orientalism is not a mere political subject or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions," but rather "a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philological texts." European literature for Said carried, actualised, and propelled Orientalist notions forward and constantly reinforced them. Put differently, literature produced by Europeans made possible the domination of the people of the 'East' because of the Orientalist discourse embedded within these texts. Literature here is understood as a kind of carrier and distributor of ideology.

He underscored again and again the importance of understanding the intimate relationship between knowledge and power, declaring: "If the knowledge of Orientalism has any meaning, it is in being a reminder of the seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere, at any time."

Significance of *Orientalism*

The significance of *Orientalism* lies in its method of taking up the question of cultural difference and politics of representation. Said's approach has gone beyond the study of Orient and provided the methodology to critique any form of cultural prejudice and misrepresentation. The book, in other words, has supplied the methodology of writing back to power. It opened up the possibility of the silent having a voice not only against the Western cultural hegemony, but similar other hegemonic practices in different locales; it paved the way for deconstructing, multiple other relationships of domination and subordination. The book has proved most influential in the area of colonial discourse analysis and is considered to be the originary text for postcolonial studies. Said's formulations have been critically worked upon and extended by Homi K. Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak , who, along with Said, are considered to be the 'Holy Trinity' in the field of postcolonial studies. Bhabha admits that the object of colonial discourse is to construct the colonised people as degenerate and inferior on the basis of race to justify colonisation and establish a system of colonial administration, but he claims that at the heart of colonial discourse there is ambivalence. The object of colonial discourse is to produce the 'mimic man' – almost the same but "not quite/ not white" Other. The colonial ambition of producing this 'mimic' subjects is never fully met, because colonial discourse aims at combining sameness with difference. The mimic man, Bhabha argues in "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," is an "effect of flawed colonial mimesis" because mimicry is "a sign of double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline." Mimicry, therefore, is "at once resemblance and menace." "The menace of mimicry" as Bhabha puts it, "is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence also disrupts authority" .

The 'mimic man,' therefore, is a subversive space, a site of potential threat to the empire. Like Bhabaha, Spivak is also critical of Said at some points, but she gives Said the full credit for creating a theoretical space that has given voice to the marginal. Spivak's work on subalternity draws on Said. The exponents of subaltern studies and postcolonial historians like Ranajit Guha,

Dipesh Chakravarty and Partha Chatterjee, to name a few, have been inspired by Said's thesis in *Orientalism*